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Abstract
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This paper evaluates the impact of economic regulation 
on infrastructure sector outcomes. It tests the impact 
of regulation from three different angles: aligning costs 
with tariffs and firm profitability; reducing opportunistic 
renegotiation; and measuring the effects on productivity, 
quality of service, coverage, and prices. The analysis 
uses an extensive data set of about 1,000 infrastructure 
concessions granted in Latin America from the late 1980s 
to the early 2000s.  
   The analysis finds that as the theory indicates, 
regulation matters. The empirical work here reported 
This paper—a product of the Sustainable Development Department in the Latin America and the Caribbean Region—is 
part of a larger effort in the department to understand the determinants for performance in the infrastructure sectors. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted 
at jguasch@worldbank.org and landres@worldbank.org.  
shows that in three relevant economic aspects—aligning 
costs and tariffs; dissuading renegotiations; and 
improving productivity, quality of service, coverage, 
and tariffs—the structure, institutions, and procedures 
of regulation matter. Thus, significant efforts should 
continue to be made to improve the structure, quality, 
and institutionality of regulation. Regulation matters for 
protecting both consumers and investors, for aligning 
closely financial returns and the costs of capital, and for 
capturing higher levels of benefits from the provision of 
infrastructure services by the private sector. 
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As part of structural reforms in infrastructure industries during the 1990s, more than US$ 750 
billion was invested in 2,500 private infrastructure projects in developing economies. Nearly half 
went to the Latin American region, mainly through the divestiture of public assets in 
telecommunications and electricity sectors and transport concessions. Six countries – Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru – absorbed more than 90 percent of all private 
investments. Overall, the region was the largest beneficiary of the huge flow of private 
investments for infrastructure worldwide with private investment peaking at around US$ 130 
billion in 1997. Since then, investors’ appetites have waned, public support to privatization 
decreased and the role of public investments in the provision of infrastructure services has gained 
momentum again
1.  While the increase of public investments is welcomed, given the magnitude 
of infrastructure needs in the region – roughly 4 to 6 percent of GDP per year to catch up or keep 
up with countries that once trailed it, such as China and Korea – and the fiscal limitations of the 
public sector, private sector financing for infrastructure will always be important in Latin 
America.  
While in Latin American countries, state-owned enterprises continue to account for more 
than 10 percent of gross domestic product, 20 percent of investment, and about 5 percent of 
formal employment (Kikeri, 1999),  the infrastructure sector has dramatically changed. 
Specifically, while at the beginning of the 1990s only 3, 3, and almost 0 percent of the 
subscribers of fixed telecommunications, electricity and water distribution, respectively, were in 
private hands, in 2003 these ratios were 86, 60, and 11 percent.  The setting of regulatory 
frameworks has accompanied that increase of private sector participation in infrastructure.   
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There is strong evidence supporting the generally positive economic results of these 
policies. Some examples include Boardman and Vining (1989) and Megginson, Nash, and van 
Randenborgh (1994) (see Megginson and Netter, 2001, and Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes,  2003, 
for more recent reviews). Yet, public perceptions of the outcome are not very positive.   Chong 
and Lopez-de-Silanes (2003) have, among others, summarized and addressed the most voiced 
criticism.  
In the case of Latin American countries (LACs) and for the infrastructure sector, beyond 
case studies, there is little empirical literature analyzing impact and determinants. Most of it has 
focused all sectors and on the performance of financial indicators (see Megginson, Nash, and van 
Randenborgh, 1994, and D’Sousa and Megginson, 1999). Recently  Andres, Guasch, and Foster 
(2006) evaluate the impact of private sector participation on output, efficiency, labor 
productivity, quality, coverage and prices, using a large cross country data set for Latin America.  
Also, the impact of competition is analyzed in Andres, Guasch, and Foster, (2006), the issue of 
renegotiation of the concessions in Guasch, (2003), Guasch, Laffont, and Straub, (2003, 2004), 
the profitability of private infrastructure firms in   Sirtaine, Pinglo, Guasch, and Foster, (2005).  
Yet, there is little work that has focused on the determinants of outcomes and particularly 
on the impact of regulation on those outcomes. While the theory tells that regulation matters, 
there is a shortage of empirical work analyzing that issue. Some exceptions are Wallsten (2001), 
Jamasb (2005),  Cubbin and Stern (2005),  Stern and Cubbin (2004), and Minogue and Carino 
(2006). 
The objective of this paper is to add to that scarce literature, testing the impact of 
regulation from three different angles: (a) on aligning costs with tariffs- firms profitability, (b) on 
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reducing/deterring opportunistic renegotiation, and (c) on its effects on productivity, quality of 
service, coverage and prices.  That is done respectively in Sections 2, 3 and 4 respectively. 
The analysis uses an extensive data set of about 1000 concessions granted in Latin 
America from the late 1980s to the early 2000s compiled by Guasch (2004).  
 
2.  Testing the Impact of Regulation on Aligning Costs with Tariffs-firms Profitability 
 
Unlike normal competitive business sectors, the profitability of concessions is not simply a 
reflection of market conditions and managerial competence, but is to a considerable extent 
determined⎯or at least circumscribed⎯by regulatory decisions. Infrastructure companies 
operate mostly under a monopoly regime and thus are subject to regulation of tariffs and other 
aspects of enterprise performance. Thus, the observed profitability of these concessions in part 
should reflect the quality of the regulatory framework and the performance of the regulators that 
oversee them. 
 
2.1   Theoretical framework 
 
Regulation aims to protect consumers from abuse of monopoly power and investors from 
opportunistic behavior by the government, given the politically sensitive nature of infrastructure 
tariffs and the large sunk cost characteristics of the companies’ investments. In consequence, 
regulatory decisions have a substantial impact on the profitability of companies. Ideally, the 
regulator’s objective should be to maintain alignment between a company’s rate of return and its 
cost of capital. This is because a rate of return in excess of the cost of capital inappropriately 
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penalizes consumers, while a rate of return beneath the cost of capital inappropriately 
discourages further investment. The closeness of that alignment will depend, among other things, 
on the quality of regulation.   
In theory, the closeness with which the rate of return tracks the cost of capital will also 
depend on the chosen regulatory regime. Under rate of return regulation, the regulator has the 
possibility of making frequent price adjustments to keep realigning the company’s rate of return 
with its cost of capital. Under price cap regulation, on the other hand, the regulator sets tariffs so 
that expected returns match the cost of capital ex ante, but allows these returns to diverge ex post 
during the periods between regulatory reviews. However, in practice, in Latin America, the 
distinction between price cap and rate of return regulation is somewhat blurred due to frequent 
renegotiation of infrastructure contracts (Guasch, 2004; Guasch and Spiller, 1999; Gomez-
Ibanez, 2003)
 2, and to the fact that review methodologies sometimes take into account historic 
divergences between the rate of return and the cost of capital in adjusting future prices, which 
goes against the forward looking principles of price cap regulation. Thus, the practice in the 
region would best be described as a hybrid regime.  
Therefore, instead of focusing on the dichotomy between price cap and rate of return 
regulation, the approach taken is to develop a measure of the overall quality of the regulator that 
oversees each of the companies in the sample. The purpose of this section, then, is to empirically 
evaluate the impact of the quality of regulation on the profitability of the firms. The hypothesis is 
that the better the quality of regulation, the closer is likely to be the correspondence between the 
firm’s rate of return and the firm’s cost of capital. 




2.2  Measuring regulatory quality 
 
In order to test this hypothesis a quantitative measure of regulatory quality is needed. 
Good regulation is defined by clear, stable and predictable rules, a purely professional and 
technical interpretation of the law and contract, ability to withstand influences and pressures 
from the stakeholders such as government and operators, and the establishment of a predictable 
and adequate allocation of resources. In consequence, the index developed here considers three 
key dimensions of regulatory quality: legal solidity, financial strength, and decision-making 
autonomy.  The construction of each of these indices and associated scoring method are detailed 
in Table 1 below. 
Legal solidity refers to the stability, and thus predictability, of the regulatory regime. The 
strongest legal foundation is when the regulatory framework is embedded into a law, as opposed 
to a less strong legal instrument-less difficult to change (such as a decree or a contract if the 
judiciary is not reliable).  
Financial strength refers to the resources the regulatory agency has to undertake its 
functions. This dimension has two aspects. The first aspect is financial independence, which is 
achieved when a regulatory entity has its own source of revenue (for example via a sectoral 
surcharge) that does not depend on the government budget. The second aspect is financial 
strength, which is a function of the size of the agency’s budget. 
Decision-making autonomy measures the likelihood that regulatory decisions are based 
on technical as opposed to political criteria. This dimension has three aspects. The first aspect is 
independence of appointment, which measures the extent to which the appointment process 
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avoids a purely political appointee without adequate technical knowledge of the sector. The 
second aspect is duration of appointment, which indicates whether a regulator can be reappointed 
and hence might be less likely to act independently and issue professionally and technically 
based decisions. The third aspect is collegiality of decisions, which measures the relative 
difficulty of regulatory capture, thought to be lower when multiple regulators act jointly within a 
board structure.   
While each of these elements are individually relevant, it is also of interest to aggregate 
them into a single quality index that gives equal weight to each of the three dimensions that have 
been identified. For the sample of companies covered in this study, the average score on this 
index of overall regulatory quality is 0.51 as against a potential maximum of 1.0, suggesting that 
the quality of regulation is not overall very high. However, there is significant variation in 
quality across countries and sectors, with scores ranging widely between 0.12 and 0.85. The 
highest average score is obtained on legal solidity, 0.65, as against decision-making autonomy, 
0.56, and financial strength, 0.34. Pair-wise correlations between each of the regulatory quality 
measures are typically low at around 0.20, and in no case greater than 0.57. In some cases, pair-
wise correlations even take negative values, suggesting that high regulatory quality along one 
dimension is correlated with low regulatory quality along another dimension. This result 
illustrates that few countries have consistently applied all of the design principles needed to 
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Table 1:   Regulatory quality index:  components and construction 
  Weight Scoring 
Legal solidity  0.33  1 if regulatory framework established by law, 0 otherwise. 
Financial capacity  0.34  Sum of scores on factors detailed below. 
•  Financial independence  0.17  • 1 if funded from regulatory levy, 0 if funded from public 
budget 
•  Financial strength  0.17  • Regulatory budget as % sectoral GDP normalized on [0,1] 
scale 
Decision-making autonomy  0.33  Sum of scores on factors detailed below. 
•  Independence of 
appointment 
0.11  • 0 if appointed directly by Executive, 1 if screening by 
legislature 
•  Duration of appointment  0.11  • 1 for a single fixed term, 0 for indefinite appointment 
•  Collegiality of decisions  0.11  • 1 if headed by regulatory commission, 0 if by individual 
regulator 
Note: Scores between 0 and 1 are given for intermediate cases. 
These indices of regulatory quality are used to try to explain differences in the divergence 
between rate of return and cost of capital across the different companies in the sample
2. This is 
done by regressing the difference between the Project Internal Rate of Return and the Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital (IRR-WACC) against this set of explanatory variables. The hypothesis 
is that the greater the quality of regulation, as measured by the described index, the smaller the 
differential should be, suggesting that the regulatory quality sub-indexes would enter the 
regression with negative signs.  
Two separate measures of the IRR-WACC differential are considered. The first measure 
is the simple IRR-WACC differential. This captures the quality of regulation purely from a 
short-term consumer’s perspective, since the smaller the IRR-WACC differential (including 
negative values), the lower the resulting tariffs for consumers. However, this constitutes a 
myopic view since a negative IRR-WACC undermines investment incentives and therefore 
                                                 
2 From that universe of private contracts, we used a sample of 34 concessions built by Sirtaine, Pinglo, Guasch, and 
Foster (2005), using the following criteria: (i) to include most Latin American countries with meaningful 
privatization programs; (ii) to include companies from all main infrastructure sectors; (iii) to focus on companies 
with at least 5 years of operations (in order to have a time series of data of adequate duration for the analysis); and 
(iv) to focus on companies publishing good quality financial statements. 
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ultimately penalizes consumers through declining service quality, decelerating service 
expansion, and potential flight of investors. Therefore, the absolute IRR-WACC differential is 
taken as a second relevant measure. According to this indicator, what matters is minimizing the 
distance between IRR and WACC, with positive and negative differentials regarded as equally 
reflective of poor regulatory decisions. 
 
2.3    Simple differential (myopic consumer protection)  
 
The results for the first set of regressions are reported in Table 2, using each of the four 
measures of IRR-WACC differential.
3 Despite small sample sizes, three out of the four models 
show that the regulatory quality variables are significant in overall terms, and are on their own 
capable of explaining 20-25 percent of the IRR-WACC differential. Moreover, some of the 
regulatory quality variables are also individually significant. Thus, the financial strength variable 
is significant at the 5 percent level in most of the regressions with the expected negative sign, 
indicating that regulators with larger budgets tend to have greater success in minimizing the IRR-
WACC differential. In addition, the collegiality of decision variable is also significant at the 5 
percent level, but takes a positive sign. This suggests that, arguably contrary to expectations, 
regulatory entities headed by a single superintendent do a better job at reducing the IRR-WACC 
differential than do broader based regulatory commissions.
4
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Table 2:  Summary of regression results 








Financial independence  -0.340  -0.174  -0.151  -0.135 
Financial strength  -0.372    -0.332
**    -0.355
**     -0.370
** 
Legal solidity  -0.026  0.077  0.070  0.080 
Independence of appointment  -0.109  -0.068  -0.101  -0.109 
Duration of appointment  -0.125  -0.011  -0.038  -0.030 
Collegiality of decisions     0.455
**     0.256
**     0.271
**     0.267
** 
Constant -0.341  -0.047  -0.022  0.002 
P-value 0.156    0.072
*    0.052
**    0.045
** 
Adjusted R-squared  0.124  0.208  0.237  0.248 
No. of observations  32  30  30  30 
Notes: Regressions based on 30 observations; 
*, 
**, 
*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively 
 
2.4    Absolute differential (protecting both consumers and investors) 
 
The results of the second set of regressions are reported in Table 3.  Given that taking the 
absolute value of the IRR-WACC differential reduces the spread across observations in an 
already small sample, a log-linear specification is used to ensure that there is adequate variation 
for the purposes of the regression. Overall, this second set of regressions does not perform as 
well as the first. Nevertheless, two of the models show overall significance at the 5-10 percent 
level and are able to explain around 20 percent of the variation in the IRR-WACC differential. 
As before, the financial strength variable proves to be significant in some specifications, though 
not always with the expected sign. On the other hand, the collegiality of decisions is no longer 
statistically significant. The lower level of significance and explanatory power associated with 
this second set of regressions may simply be reflecting the fact that regulatory efforts are more 
strongly motivated by short-term considerations of keeping prices as low as possible for current 
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consumers, than by long term considerations of keeping returns as close as possible to hurdle 
rates for investors.  
 
Table 3:  Summary of regression results 








Financial independence  1.071  -0.653  -0.001  0.071 
Financial strength     2.619
**  -2.478     -2.488
**    -2.140
** 




1.147 0.974 0.577  -0.050 
Duration of appointment  -0.478  1.412  1.053  0.767 
Collegiality of decisions  -1.771  -0.810  -0.456  -0.243 
Constant  -1.104    -2.618
** -2.365
**    -2.487
** 
P-value   0.094
*  0.273  0.125     0.049
** 
R-squared 0.171  0.069  0.156  0.242 
No. of observations  32  30  30  30 
Notes: Regressions based on 30 observations; 
*, 
**, 
*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively 
 
The conclusion of this analysis is that regulation matters in aligning cost of capital and 
rate of return, as variations in quality across regulatory regimes are significant and material in 
determining the size of the IRR-WACC differential. However, regulatory efforts seem to be 
more closely associated with minimizing the simple IRR-WACC differential (and thereby 
keeping tariffs as low as possible for current consumers), than with minimizing the absolute 
IRR-WACC differential (and thereby keeping profitability well aligned with hurdle rates of 
return). Another striking feature of the results is that regulatory quality variables seem to have 
overall significance, more than individual significance, in determining IRR-WACC differentials. 
This is in fact consistent with the fact that performance along different dimensions of regulatory 
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quality is not highly correlated, and that the benefits of high regulatory quality along one 
dimension can be completely offset by low regulatory quality along another dimension. Thus for 
regulation to be effective, one needs the whole package of regulatory characteristics. If some of 




We have analyzed the differences between returns and costs of capital and shown that the 
variation of net returns across concessions can be partially explained by the quality of regulation. 
We have shown that the better the quality of regulation the closer the alignment between 
financial returns and costs of capital as is desirable.  Quality of regulation is found to be a 
significant determinant of the divergence between the overall profitability of the concession and 
its corresponding hurdle rate, explaining around 20 percent of the variation.  Thus we have 
shown that regulation indeed matters.  However, regulatory efforts seem to be more closely 
associated with keeping tariffs as low as possible for current consumers, than keeping 
profitability well aligned with hurdle rates of return. 
  The policy implications are clear. Significant efforts should continue to be placed to 
improve the quality of regulation.  
 
3.  Testing the Impact of Regulation on Reducing/Deterring Opportunistic 
Renegotiation 
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3.1   Concessions contracts in Latin America 
 
In Latin America, a majority of the privatization cases took the form of concession 
contracts. This was mostly to avoid political, legal and sometimes constitutional impediments to 
the outright sale of state assets to private operators that were often foreign firms. A concession 
contract grants a private firm or consortium the right to operate a given infrastructure in 
exchange for the revenues generated by users' payments, and lasts for a limited period of time (in 
general between 15 and 30 years), after which the underlying assets are devolved to the state.  
However, concession contracts have suffered from a number of problems, the most 
serious of which has been renegotiation. Considering an exhaustive sample of more than 1,000 
concessions in Latin America and the Caribbean during the period 1985-2000, and excluding 
telecommunications where most projects were real privatizations with transfer of assets, 41 
percent of the total projects in the three remaining sectors were renegotiated at some point. In 
water and transport, renegotiations have affected 74 and 55 percent of the projects respectively, 
and have occurred 1.6 years and 3.1 years on average after the award (Guasch, 2004). 
  Such renegotiations have had a negative impact on users, including the need for 
additional risk premium ex ante (Guasch and Spiller, 1999), and ex post service disruption, non-
compliance with expansion targets and excessive prices due to cost pass-through charged to 
customers, among others. For example, the Mexican toll road program, which consisted of 52 
highways built in the early 1990s, was finally bailed out by the government in 1997. The 
estimated cost was between 1 and 1.7 percent of GDP (Guasch, Laffont, and Straub, 2005). It 
therefore becomes important to understand the reasons for these failures and in particular the role 
that regulation has in determining those outcomes. That is the aim of this section. 




3.2  Renegotiations of concession contracts and their determinants 
 
Renegotiations may be of two types: renegotiations initiated by operators (Guasch, 
Laffont and Straub, 2003) or those at the initiative of local or national governments (Guasch, 
Laffont and Straub, 2005). Firm-led renegotiations might be related to economic shocks such as 
a devaluation or a recession, or might be opportunistic, when a firm that was previously awarded 
a concession seeks a bilateral negotiation with the government or the regulatory agency to strike 
a better deal than the initially agreed one. This may significantly reduce the benefit of the 
competitive pressure introduced by the ex ante auction procedure, first simply because the agreed 
parameters (tariffs, transfers) are modified and second because firms that anticipate this may be 
tempted to strategically undercut rivals at the bidding stage. 
  Government-led renegotiations may sometimes be of a Pareto improving nature (related 
to unforeseen contingencies), but most of them are opportunistic, with politicians during or after 
an election campaign reneging on previous contracts to please their constituencies. Recent 
cancellations of water concessions in 2005 in Bolivia and the ongoing renegotiations of most 
concessions in Argentina after the 2001 crisis, in which the government refuses any significant 
adjustment of the rates converted to devalued pesos despite contract clauses that contemplated 
indexation to the dollar and US inflation, and are examples in case. 
A look at the data in Table 4 shows that regional volatility seems to play an important 
role in the timing of these renegotiations. For example, a number of them occurred around the 
hyperinflation at the end of the 80s in Argentina, during and after the Tequila crisis in 1995 in 
Mexico and at the time of the Real devaluation in 1999 in Brazil. It is therefore interesting to 
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find out if economic shocks were the only determinants of renegotiations, or if there were other 
flaws, in contract or regulatory framework design, that were pivotal in explaining the high 
incidence of renegotiation. 
 
Table 4: Renegotiation by Type of Initiator and Year 
    1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
All countries                                        
outstanding 
concessions 10 38 38 50 78  103  123  132  156  187  187  165   
Number of 
renegotiations  0 13  3  9 12 14 23 15 15 11 27 20 162 
Firm-led  reneg. 0  12 2 2 0 1 3 3  11 4 1  14 53 
Govt-led  reneg. 0 0 0 0  10  13  19  11 3 7  25 6 94 
Joint-led  reneg. 0 1 1 7 2 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 15 
Source:  Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2005) 
 
Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2003, 2005) results are based on a sample comprising 307 
projects in the water and transport sectors, in five countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia 
and Mexico), across 12 years, for a total of 1287 observations (see Guasch, 2004). For each 
contract, there is information on the general characteristics of the projects (sector, year of award, 
duration), on the award process, the investment and financing conditions, the institutional and 
regulatory context and the type of price regulation in place (price cap versus rate of return), and 
other contract clauses (arbitration, income guarantees, take-over clauses, etc.). These are 
completed by macroeconomic data (growth rate, exchange rate evolution), dummies for national 
and local elections and a full set of institutional indicators (corruption, quality of the 
bureaucracy, rule of law). 
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  The initial estimations are based on a random effect probit, which is a linearized version 
of the equations giving the probabilities of firm-led and government-led renegotiations in the 
respective theoretical models: 
 
  y int = I [y*int = xiα1 + α2 zint + Entα3 + eint < 0], 
 
For concession i, in country n, at time t, yint is the binary variable indicating whether there 
was a renegotiation by the firm (resp. by the government), x is a vector of time-invariant 
characteristics of the contract, z is the time elapsed since the award, and E is a vector of 
environmental characteristics, including economic shocks, elections and quality of institutions. 
Alternatively, Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2003) present a competing risk duration 
model, which allows for both type of renegotiations hazard simultaneously. The specific model 
used follows Han and Hausman’s (1990) semi-parametric competing risk model, with a non-
parametric baseline hazard consisting of a set of dummy variables for each period. This model is 
estimated using a bivariate probit with the complete set of period dummies. 
One major econometric issue is the fact that most contract clauses, such as the type of 
price regulation or specific guarantees included, must be considered to be endogenous. Indeed, 
we expect the contracting parties to choose them according to their observable and unobservable 
characteristics and those of the projects. For example, the type of tariff regulation chosen is 
likely to be affected by the potential efficiency of the concessionaire (more efficient firms would 
prefer price cap regulation, which is more risky but makes them residual claimant for their cost 
savings) and also by the fact that riskier projects would call for lower-powered (rate of return) 
regulation. Similarly, most types of guarantees have in general been included to convince private 
agents to take on more risky concessions, as in the case of toll road programs for which demand 
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proves very difficult to predict accurately. The challenge is thus to control for this ex ante self-
selection effect in order to assess correctly the ex post specific incentive effect of the variables 
under study. 
To tackle this, we implement in the two models mentioned above a two-stage 
instrumental variable procedure using as instrument a number of exogenous characteristics of the 
environment such as, institutional quality, sectors of activity and the existence of a regulator.  
For the variables found to be endogenous according to the Rivers and Vuong (1988) test, we take 
the predicted values from the first stage estimations, insert them in the second stage model and 
adjust the standard errors with a bootstrapping procedure. Unsurprisingly, the variables for which 
exogeneity is rejected are price cap regulation, the investment and financing variables, and 
clauses such as minimum income guarantee and existence of an arbitration body.  
The results arising from both models are strongly consistent. Table 5 presents the results 
both types of renegotiations. It shows that contract characteristics, political and economic 
variables, and regulation all matter in explaining the frequency of renegotiations. 
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 Table 5:  Estimates of the determinants of renegotiations 
  Firm-led Renegotiations
Government-led 
Renegotiations 













































Log likelihood  -251.1   
Number of observations  1132   
Source: Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2003, 2005). Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is 
noted by ***, **,* respectively. 
 
3.3 Regulation  and  renegotiations 
 
First, the existence of a regulator at the time the concession contract is signed appears to 
be crucial in avoiding failures during the early life of concession projects. This aspect has the 
strongest marginal effect of all variables found to be statistically significant. Comparing three 
specific contracts out of the initial sample, and using the probabilities predicted by the empirical 
model, Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2003) show that had a regulator been in place at the time of 
awarding the contract, the respective probabilities of renegotiation in the last year of existence of 
the contract would have been reduced from 29.7, 9.9, and 3.1 percent, to 5.3, 0.3, and 0.2 percent 
respectively. 
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Depending on the type of renegotiation that is considered, at least two complementary 
lines of explanation are relevant here. On the one hand, regulators seem to allow for better 
contracts from the start, which reduces the necessity of posterior adjustments for unforeseen 
contingencies (this is particularly relevant for firm-led renegotiations). In the Latin American 
context, characterized by frequent, and difficult to predict, economic shocks and by the imperfect 
enforcement of contracts, drafting complete contracts is bound to fail. Moreover, long and 
complex contracts are often inefficient, because they lack transparency and lend themselves to 
contradictory interpretations and therefore opportunistic revision claims. As a consequence, most 
contracts are short concession-specific documents that rely on complementary rules contained in 
the relevant jurisprudence. This approach makes previous regulatory experience in dealing with 
the design of concessions contracts pivotal in limiting the occurrence of later renegotiations. 
On the other hand, regulators are even more effective in weak governance environments 
and appear to constitute a barrier against opportunistic behavior by governments (Guasch, 
Laffont and Straub, 2005). This conclusion is supported by several significant interactions 
showing for example that the previous existence of a regulator has a stronger marginal effect in a 
context characterized by more corruption, or that a good quality bureaucracy is more effective in 
limiting the incidence of renegotiations after elections. Finally, Guasch, Laffont and Straub 
(2005) also show that the fact that the regulator does not belong to a ministry significantly 
reduces the probability of government-led renegotiation. In that regard, these firm-level results 
confirm some cross-country studies results that show the importance of experienced and 
independent regulators in the telecommunication and electricity sectors (Wallsten, 2001; Cubbin 
and Stern, 2005). 
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Second, the choice of price regulation, between a price cap and a rate of return scheme, is 
of utmost importance. Beside well-known concerns with price cap regulation, in particular 
regarding the impact on quality and the implied risk transfer from consumers to the firm, 
Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2003, 2005) show that the main consequence of choosing a price 
cap regulatory scheme is the increased probability of renegotiation. Looking again at the 
marginal effect, they show for example that had the three random sample contracts-used to make 
this simulation analysis- been under a rate of return scheme, the respective probabilities of firm-
led renegotiation in the last year of existence of the contract would have been reduced from 29.7, 
9.9, and 3.1 percent, to 13.8, 3.3, and 0.8 percent respectively. 
Given  that in the sample under study, above 70 percent of the concessions are regulated 
by price cap, this is clearly a major concern. Moreover, price cap schemes increase the riskiness 
of projects, which is reflected in an increase of the cost of capital and implies that firms end up 
facing higher interest.  In contexts where institutions are weak, inexperienced and often unable to 
resist political pressures, the consequence is that most regulated firms (or the government and 
interest groups related to the firms) appropriate the gains when the conjuncture is favorable, but 
are able to transfer the losses to consumers during bad times.  
As a consequence, there is a growing pragmatic tendency to advocate the abandonment of 
price cap regulation, a synonym for the higher risk of renegotiation and higher cost of capital, 
and the return to an hybrid type of regulation, including some elements of rate of return (see for 
example Estache, Guasch and Trujillo, 2003). Such a move would imply recognizing that the 
shift to a hybrid regulatory scheme is imposed de facto by ex post renegotiations, which carry 
high associated social costs, because they tend to endogenize the regulatory review lags. In this 
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situation, it could prove less costly to adapt regulatory rules from the start by adopting lower-




In summary, two related dimensions of regulation matter when it comes to avoiding 
disruptive renegotiations. The first one is the regulatory environment, including the very 
existence of a regulator from the start, but also its independence from potential political 
pressures. The second one is the type of price regulation itself. It should be noted that these two 
aspects can hardly be separated. Indeed, price cap regulation has often been the salient choice of 
governments lacking previous experience with regulation, because it appeared to be less 
informationally demanding. The absence of a regulator when initiating transfers of infrastructure 
to the private sector and the choice of price cap therefore often went in tandem. The results 
mentioned above show that a better strategic approach would be for governments to consider a 
sequence including first the development of a correctly endowed and reasonably independent 
regulatory agency, which would subsequently be in charge of the definition of the contract and 
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4.  Testing the Impact of Regulation on Productivity, Quality of Service, Coverage and 
Prices 
 
4.1   Overview 
 
This section uses the framework developed in  Andres, Guasch, and Foster (2006). As we 
have already described, their analysis splits the data into three periods: “pre-privatization”, 
transition, and post-privatization periods, where the transitional period commences after the 
concession announcement and lasts until one year after the concession award. The motivation for 
this segmentation is that some of the more important changes start simultaneously with the 
privatization announcement and lasts one year after the change in ownership. In addition, some 
of these indicators are driven by firm specific time trends and not privatization itself; therefore, 
the authors also control for this effect. Their main results are summarized as follows:  
(i)  After controlling for a positive firm-specific time trend, data for service coverage 
suggests that privatization has an upward impact on telecommunications, but no 
effect on electricity and water and sanitation.  
(ii)  Indicators for technical losses are positively affected by privatization. While most of 
the improvement for electricity happens during the transition period, those for 
telecommunications, water, and sanitation occur later. 
(iii)  Prices also significantly increased for the sectors during and after the transition except 
in telecommunications as the average cost of installation of a residential line 
decreased in every period (the monthly charge for residential service, however, 
increased substantially). 
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(iv)  Labor productivity significantly changed in all the three sectors, mainly during the 
transition period, and fundamentally caused an important reduction in labor 
redundancy: in the electricity and water and sanitation sectors, employment decreased 
on average 10 percent per year during the transition period. 
(v)  The outcomes’ results are significantly heterogeneous across firms. 
 
The current analysis is based on the last conclusion that shows the heterogeneity across 
firms. Our proposal attempts to better understand the determinants for this heterogeneity across 
utilities. The hypothesis is that some procedural and regulatory differences might explain some 
of these variances.  
Here we focus on four basic regulatory characteristics: (1) budget autonomy; (2) the legal 
autonomy of the regulatory body; (3) tariff regulation (price cap, rate of return, among others); 
and (4) duration of the regulatory board. Additionally, we will control for some additional 
features such as the award process (direct selection vs. auction process), the award criterion 
(highest price; lower tariff or investment plan), and the nationality of the concessionaire. The 
premise is that these divergences may significantly affect the incentives involved in the 
managerial decision process, which, in turn, affects firm performance on efficiency, quality, and 
price.  
 
4.2   Procedure 
 
Ideally, to assess the impact of privatization, the performance of utilities under private 
operation should be evaluated against comparable public-operated firms from similar 
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environments, assuming these firms are the contra-factual of the privatized ones. In most cases, it 
is hard to identify an analogous firm; hence, most of the literature compares the evolution of 
selected indicators before and after the change in ownership.  
Most of the literature employs two different strategies to estimate the effect of the 
privatization. First, since Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh (1994), there have been 
several studies using means and medians of the periods before and after the event of 
privatization, as there has also testing on the significance of the change. Some research considers 
different samples of SOEs among countries and evaluates indicators. Another branch of literature 
assumes these policies to be treatments and follows the literature of program evaluation (see 
Heckman and Robb, 1985) by proposing  a dummy for those periods where the SOE was 
privately owned, and checks its significance, as well as other interactions with characteristics 
specific to each paper (for example, Boardman and Vining, 1989; Ros, 1999). 
In this section we propose a modification of Andres, Guasch, and Foster (2006), by 
introducing interactions between the privatization dummies and the characteristics described 
previously. More specifically, we define a dummy for the transition and another for the after-
transition period: 
 
( ) ∑ + + + =
ij
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where  are the variables of interest (outputs, inputs, labor productivity, efficiency, 
quality, coverage and prices). The main coefficients in this model are the dummies 
   and   that are equal to one, if the firm i of country 
ijt y
ijt TRAN DUMMY _ ijt POST DUMMY _ j  
were in a transitional or port-transitional year at time t. Given the fact that there are several 
variables not observable to the econometrician, fixed effects are included to capture the 
characteristics of the firm, such as, management, initial conditions, size, density of the network, 
as well as other aspects, which we assume to be constant for each firm across time. This fixed 
effect is captured by  . Additionally,   is a time trend that has a value equal to zero for the 
privatization award year. Thus, the first dummy identifies the average change in the dependent 
variable during the transition with respect to the average level previous to those years. The 
second dummy identifies the average change of the dependent variable after the transition with 
respect to the first period. Therefore,    and   capture the effect on the outcome of interest, 
during the transition and after that, given by the change in ownership. 
ij D ijt s
T δ
P δ
A second version of the equation (1) will also be estimated here with the  introduction of 
a firm-specific time trend:  








ijt t D POST DUMMY TRAN DUMMY y υ θ φ δ δ _ _ ln       (2) 
Equation (2) will use the same dependent variables as well as the dummies used in the 
static model. However, the fourth coefficient captures the time trend of the variable of interest. 
Several factors may affect this, like the initial conditions. Hence, it is important to control for the 
firm’s specific value. 
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To identify the different characterization effects of the privatization process as well as the 
regulation, we test the variables with the two main dummies. More precisely:  
( ) ∑ + + + =
ij




ijt D X POST DUM X TRAN DUM y υ φ δ δ * _ * _ ln  (3) 








ijt t D X POST DUM X TRAN DUM y υ θ φ δ δ * _ * _ ln       (4) 
Now  , which was used as a scalar number in our previous specifications, becomes a vector 
with the coefficients for each characteristic of the vector     that is of the form 
T δ
ijt X ( )
N
ijt ijt x x ,..., , 1
1  
with N as the total number of characteristics evaluated. The first coefficient of the vector   will 
became the average effect of change in ownership during the transitional period on a given 
indicator for a firm without the characteristics evaluated in the other elements of the vector  .  
Equivalently, the vector   contains the coefficients for the different characteristics of 





Since we are using a semi-logarithmic functional form of these models for each of the 
indicators, when interpreting the coefficient estimates of the dummy, it should be remembered 
that the percentage impact in each indicator is given by  .  1 −
δ e
Correcting for potential nonspherical errors requires a more adequate approach, such as, 
the Generalized Least Square (GLS); however, this estimation requires the knowledge of the 
unconditional variance matrix of  ijt υ , Ω, up to scale. Hence, we must be able to write  , 
where   is a known GxG positive definite matrix. As this matrix is unknown, we will follow a 
Feasible GLS (FGLS) approach that replaces the unidentified matrix   with a consistent 
estimator. Hence, our models specify heteroskedastic error structure with no cross-sectional 
correlation. 
C
2 σ = Ω
C
Ω






For our research we use an official data set provided by public and private sectors, as 
well as a novel one built by the World Bank. First, by using the official data reported by the 
firms to their investors and statistical reports of the regulator agencies of each country, we build 
an unbalanced panel data set of key indicators on outputs, inputs, labor productivity, efficiency, 
quality, coverage, and prices. Furthermore, we requested information from each of the 
companies and international organizations like the ITU (International Telecommunication 
Union), the OLADE (Latin American Organization of Energy), as well as information provided 
by each regulatory office. We make a particular effort in corroborating the company data with 
several public sources and with data from the firms provided by different governmental offices. 
We are also particularly cautious about the consistency and comparability of the data across time 
and countries (see Andres, Guasch, and Foster, 2006). 
Secondly, the novel dataset built by the World Bank describes the characteristics of 
nearly 1,000 infrastructure projects awarded in Latin American and Caribbean countries from 
1989 to 2002, in the sectors of telecommunications, energy, transportation and water. (See 
Guasch, 2003.) 
The analysis focuses on several indicators of outcomes, inputs, labor productivity, 
efficiency, quality, coverage and prices. Some of these variables are used by other authors with 
other samples, such as, Ros (1999), who employs equivalent indicators for coverage,  labor 
productivity,  quality and prices for the telecommunications sector. Ramamurti (1996) uses 
analogous indicators in output, coverage, and labor productivity for the four Latin American 
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telecommunications firms of his study. Saal and Parker (2001) use similar indicators for output, 
employment, quality, and prices for water and sewerage companies in England and Wales. 
Table 6 shows the summary statistics of these variables in each sector. 
Table 6:  Summary statistics 
Variable N Mean Median SD Min Max
Electricity Distribution
Number of subscribers 98 497,776           225,230           681,698           2,700               3,884,579       
Output [thousand of KWHs] 100 2,850               789.5               5,282               13.8                 34,300            
Number of employees 87 1,421               625                  2,115               18                    13,642            
Subscribers per employee 84 558.81             506.67             244.20             210.45             1,523.27         
Output per employee 84 2,343.48          2,116.46          1,298.60          663.86             7,323.09         
Distributional losses 90 15.3% 13.6% 6.6% 2.0% 33.9%
Duration of interruptions per subscriber 65 25.26               20.36               21.01               1.75                 100.00            
Frequency of interruptions per subscriber 67 22.63               16.03               21.24               1.07                 100.00            
Subscribers per 100 HHs 86 74.6% 81.3% 20.7% 7.0% 100.0%
Avg price per KWH [in u$s] 92 88.70               85.34               35.43               7.47                 323.61            
Fixed Telecommunications
Number of subscribers 16 2,423,040        824,594           3,150,005        28,048             9,642,200       
Output (million of minutes) 13 20,500             6,200               28,800             774                  83,100            
Number of employees 16 12,268             9,732               12,097             966                  47,949            
Subscribers per employee 16 209.30             109.27             241.96             33.81               736.65            
Output per employee 13 1,627.35          844.29             1,790.44          257.10             6,419.45         
P% of digital lines 16 67.0% 70.3% 26.4% 14.6% 100.0%
% of completed calls 12 67.0% 64.8% 20.4% 20.0% 98.8%
Subscribers per 100 inhabitants 16 9.84 8.40 5.83 2.96 22.01
Price of 3-minute call [in u$s] 14 0.13                 0.07                 0.25                 0.01                 0.99                
Monthly charge for a resid. Sv. [in u$s] 15 6.16                 6.01                 4.52                 0.36                 19.97              
Price for the installation of a line [in u$s] 15 343.75             309.51             339.35             1.20                 1,102.26         
Water and Sewerage
Total Subscribers for water 48 147,119           78,864             223,803           1,894               1,282,074       
Total Subscribers for sewerage 43 107,286           42,991             173,795           435                  799,994          
Water Production 47 91,400             28,900             2,110               145.6               13,700,000     
Number of employees 42 528                  258                  997                  9                      6,346              
Water subscribers per employee 42 312.23             283.10             153.56             43.34               772.36            
Water production per employee 33 39.1% 37.3% 12.7% 15.3% 62.8%
Continuity [hours per day] 21 19.40               22.97               6.57                 -                  24.00              
Potability [%] 29 88.5% 98.9% 26.1% 0.0% 100.0%
Water subscribers per 100 HHs 44 74.83               88.29               34.30               0.01                 100.00            
Sewerage subscribers per 100 HHs 34 64.61               71.99               27.83               0.30                 97.70              
Avg price for water [u$s/m3]  27 0.48                 0.44                 0.16                 0.17                 0.84                
Avg price for sewerage [u$s/m3]  12 0.40               0.39               0.22               0.07                0.97               
Note: each observation is the average for the available information since 5 years before the change in ownership and 5 years after that.  
 
The countries analyzed include: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and 
Venezuela. The sample consists of unbalanced panel data that include 181 firms and 1,885 firm-
  28 
 
 
year observations. Each of the sample firms contain at least one year of pre-privatization data, 
while 150 of the 181 firms have information for at least the previous 3 years.  
We matched our previous data set with a novel dataset built by the World Bank that 
describes the characteristics of nearly 1,000 infrastructure projects awarded in Latin American 
and Caribbean countries from 1989 to 2002, in the sectors of telecommunications, energy, 
transportation and water. (See Guasch, 2004). This dataset contains information with respect to 
the privatization process we know how many bidders participated, the contract process
5, the 
award criterion
6, and the type of concession
7. With respect to the regulatory framework, we 
know how the establishment of the legal framework
8, the regulation of tariffs
9, if there were a 
possibility of contractual renegotiation, and (if this was the case) who would initiate it
10.  
The data also contain additional contractual clauses, such as, if it considered a 
termination clause, about the arbitration process, claim solving institution, obligation to provide 
universal service, duration of the contract, contract renewal, government’s guaranties, if the 
government granted subsidies, frequency of the tariff review, and how the exchange and 
commercial risk were born.  If the contract was renegotiated, we know when it was, the reason 
given for it, and its outcome. 
Some characteristics of the regulator include: an index of its autonomy, its budget source, 
the duration of the regulatory board member mandate, as well as the year of the regulatory 
board’s inceptions. Among these variables we selected those with enough variation across firms 
that allow us to better identify the effect of the differences in each outcome. Hence, Table 7 
indicates the variables that we were able to use in this analysis, while Table 8 shows the 
summary statistics of the characteristics across the sectors. 
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Table 7:  Description of the characteristics used in the analysis 
Variable Description 
Regulatory Board 
  AUTON_YES  Dummy with value 1 if the Regulatory Board was fully autonomous. 
  AUTON_PART  Dummy with value 1 if the Regulatory Board was partially autonomous. 
  DURATION  Dummy with value 1 if the duration of the Regulatory Board was 5 or more years  
Tariff Regulation 
  TARIFF_RR  Dummy with value 1 if the tariffs were regulated according to the Rate of Return 
  TARIFF_PC  Dummy with value 1 if the tariffs were regulated according to Price Cap. 
 
Table 8:  Summary statistics of the characteristics used in the analysis 
Variable # firms Mean # firms Mean # firms Mean
Regulatory Board
AUTON_YES 11 36.4% 84 39.3% 33 0.0%
AUTON_PART 11 9.1% 84 38.1% 33 27.3%
DURATION 4 75.0% 56 41.1% 9 100.0%
Tariff Regulation
TARIFF_RR 8 25.0% 106 20.8% 38 23.7%
TARIFF_PC 8 62.5% 106 91.5% 38 89.5%
Fixed Telecommunic. Electricity Distribution Water and Sanitation
 
 
4.4 Main  Results 
 
Tables 9 through 11 present the results of the regression analysis according to the four 
different specifications for each indicator. For some indicators, the interpretation of the results 
will be more relevant when considering firm-specific time trends. This applies when analyzing 
output, labor productivity, and coverage indicators; therefore, for these variables we include 
firm-specific time trends. The table clarifies when these trends were included. 
 
The results in this section suggest that most of the design characteristics of the private 
sector participation significantly affect the outcomes of each of the indicators; however, while 
some characteristics have positive effects on certain indicators, the same characteristics have 





The following section describes and expands on the more robust results across the 
different specifications. 
The findings of the chapter can be summarized in three main points. First, regulatory and 
contract characteristics matter: the manner in which privatizations are undertaken can generate 
significant performance differences. Second, each regulatory and contract characteristic affects 
each performance variable differently. In other words, a certain contract characteristic could have 
a positive influence on one performance variable while having a negative or insignificant impact 
on another. Third, some regulatory and contract variables have bigger impacts that others. For 
instance, in some cases the changes attributed to having a fully autonomous regulatory body are 
much larger than changes attributed to other regulatory variables. 
The main objective of this section is not to advocate a certain type of regulatory or 
contract design but rather to emphasize that privatization is not simply a straightforward yes-no 
decision. Indeed, there are many privatization design variables that can influence performance 
outcomes. The results in the following sections show that depending on the priorities of a 
country, certain privatization contracts or regulatory characteristics might be more important 
than others. For example, if reducing prices is of central importance to a country, then either a 
partially or fully autonomous regulatory body would be preferred over a non-autonomous one. 
negative outcomes in other instances. The set of available choices is important to consider and 
analyze when focusing on specific targets. If the target is the expansion of the network, the 
strategy will focus on certain characteristics; however, if the target is an efficiency increase, 
another set of characteristics may be analyzed. In addition, when evaluating these same cases, we 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 11:  Regression analysis – prices 
(33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40)
dum_priv_tr 0.213*** 0.140*** 0.389** 0.565*** 0.165*** 0.111*** 0.300*** 0.250***
(0.035) (0.021) (0.152) (0.098) (0.029) (0.019) (0.083) (0.048)
dum_priv_post -0.189*** 0.104*** -0.235*** -0.111* 0.198*** 0.130*** 0.259*** 0.169***
(0.032) (0.019) (0.056) (0.059) (0.025) (0.017) (0.036) (0.033)
tr_bid 1.086*** 0.191*** 0.511*** 0.144***
(0.046) (0.065) (0.086) (0.055)
pt_bid -0.340*** -0.060** -0.210*** -0.120***
(0.038) (0.029) (0.038) (0.026)
tr_auton_part -0.601*** -0.738*** -0.224 -0.723*** -0.456*** 2.009*** -0.338***
(0.066) (0.079) (0.195) (0.081) (0.069) (0.129) (0.063)
pt_auton_part 0.316*** -0.108*** 0.239*** -0.023 0.266*** -0.108*** 0.183** -0.223***
(0.072) (0.039) (0.070) (0.046) (0.083) (0.037) (0.079) (0.043)
tr_auton_yes -1.142*** -0.301*** -0.137 -0.153** -0.382*** -0.079 0.193*** -0.010
(0.049) (0.072) (0.090) (0.063) (0.081) (0.056) (0.053) (0.038)
pt_auton_yes 0.243*** -0.161*** -0.090** -0.253*** 0.133*** 0.098*** 0.019 0.063**
(0.036) (0.030) (0.041) (0.037) (0.043) (0.025) (0.031) (0.029)
tr_rb_dur -0.083** 0.019 -0.096*** -0.182***
(0.034) (0.105) (0.028) (0.066)
pt_rb_dur 0.306*** 0.126*** -0.112*** -0.175***
(0.029) (0.027) (0.022) (0.023)
tr_nation_f -0.007 0.073** -0.112 -0.182* -0.108*** -0.059** -0.020 -0.189***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.117) (0.093) (0.026) (0.025) (0.052) (0.038)
pt_nation_f 0.227*** 0.024 0.156** 0.085 0.070*** 0.046** 0.070** 0.021





tr_award_prc -0.060 -0.184** -0.052 -0.157***
(0.198) (0.078) (0.043) (0.043)
pt_award_prc 0.034 0.094** -0.010 -0.076***





Constant 3.839*** -1.227*** 4.435*** -1.183*** 4.193*** 6.614*** 4.593*** 6.715***
(0.027) (0.093) (0.095) (0.088) (0.033) (0.085) (0.056) (0.082)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Specif trend No No No No No No No No
Observations 372 550 350 528 370 548 348 526
Log-likelihood 316.7 281.2 288.7 280.6 381.3 400.5 373.5 388.7
N u m b e r  o f  f i r m s 4 46 54 26 3 4 46 54 26 3
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(ln) average prices in real currency (ln) average prices in dollars
 
 
4.4.1 Sale  Method 
Privatizations and concessions that were sold via an auction process experienced a 
reduction of 5.8 - 6.8 percent in connection numbers (depending on the regression specification) 
below the firm specific time trend during the transition. In contrast, no significant changes were 
encountered during the post-transition period. Whether or not privatizations or concessions were 
auctioned did not have a significant effect on output. When privatizations/concessions were 
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auctioned, there was a relative decrease in coverage of about 3 percent during the transition yet 
no significant changes after the transition.  
Privatizations and concessions that followed an auction process experienced a drop in 
employment of about 18-20 percent during the transition. After the transition, an additional drop 
of 9-17 percent occurred, depending on the econometric specification. In order to measure labor 
productivity, both output per employee and connections per employee were analyzed. In both 
cases, whether or not a utility was auctioned made little difference. Some evidence was found of 
a decrease in labor productivity after the transition, but this decrease was accompanied by 
several non-significant results, depending on the regression specification.  
Regardless of whether privatization processes took place through an auction, there was 
no effect on distributional losses during the transition period. However, after the transition, cases 
that were auctioned displayed distributional loss reductions between 10 and 31 percent.  
Finally, when companies were privatized via auctions, average prices in dollars rose 
during the transition and then fell after the transition. Prices in real local currency followed a 
similar trajectory. 
 
4.4.2  Autonomy of Regulatory Body 
When the regulatory body was partially autonomous, the number of connections 
decreased between 3.1 and 6.9 percent during the transition yet no significant changes occurred 
after the transition. When the regulatory body was fully autonomous, there were no significant 
changes during either period. With respect to output, when the regulatory body was partially 
autonomous, output decreased between 5.9 and 8.2 percent during the transition; however, there 
were no significant changes after the transition. When the regulatory body was fully 
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autonomous, output fell by 5.3- 8.6 percent during the transition and by about 4.5 percent after 
the transition.  
Coverage appeared to decrease slightly during the transition, when the regulatory body 
was partially autonomous, while no significant changes were encountered after the transition. 
When the regulatory body was fully autonomous, output fell by between 1.6-3.5 percent during 
the transition; no substantial changes occurred after the transition.  
Privatizations that had a partially autonomous regulatory body experienced employee 
reductions during the transition that were between 10 and 48 percent greater than reductions 
experienced without an autonomous body. The analysis found some evidence of relative 
increases in employee numbers after the transition when the regulator was partially autonomous, 
but the results were not always significant. When the regulatory body was fully autonomous, 
employee reductions were greater than those observed under partial autonomy. During the 
transition, privatization processes with a fully autonomous regulator experienced employment 
reductions that were between 27 and 54 percent greater than cases where the regulator was not 
autonomous. Changes in employment after the transition were not significant.  
When the regulatory body was partially autonomous, connections per employee increased 
between 14 and 21 percent during the transition and then fell by 15 and 26 percent after the 
transition. Labor productivity defined as output per employee followed a similar pattern although 
the drop experienced after the transition was even greater, resulting between 14 and 42 percent. 
When the regulatory body was fully autonomous, large increases in labor productivity were 
experienced during the transition: connections per employee increased between 27 and 60 
percent and output per employee increased between 15 and 48 percent. After the transition, the 
full autonomy cases experienced decreases of 10 to 35 percent in labor productivity.  
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No significant effects on distributional losses were detected during the transition when 
the regulatory body was partially autonomous. Mixed results were found during the post-
transition period, but the majority of the specifications pointed toward reductions in 
distributional losses when regulators were partially autonomous. Results were quite different 
when the regulatory body had total autonomy: distributional losses increased between 11 and 29 
percent during the transition, followed by significant losses (between 22 and 38 percent) after the 
transition.  
When regulatory bodies were partially autonomous, prices in dollars fell during the 
transition by 45-52 percent. After the transition, the analysis exhibits mixed results for prices in 
dollars. Diverse results were also found for partial autonomy in real local currency in both 
periods. In cases where the regulatory body was completely autonomous, significant price 
reductions in dollars—i.e. 26 to 68 percent—were visible during the transition. Similar to the 
partial autonomy cases, various results (in dollars) were found after the transition for full 
autonomy, although most of the regression specifications indicated a drop in prices. In real local 
currency, mixed results were found for the full autonomy cases during the transition and price 
increases of about 10 to 14 percent were found after the transition.  
In cases where the regulatory body was partially autonomous, the quality index fell by 
approximately 24 percent during the transition period and an additional 14 to 50 percent during 
the post-transition period. When the regulator was fully autonomous, most results pointed to 
large increases in quality during the transition. After the transition, the results for full autonomy 
were varied.  
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4.4.3 Duration of Regulatory Body Appointments 
With respect to the number of connections, no significant changes were observed during 
either period. However, privatizations/concessions that were regulated by bodies where 
regulators were appointed for terms of 5 or more years experienced decreases in output between 
9.7 and 11.6 percent during the transition. However, there were no significant changes after the 
transition. Privatizations/concessions that were regulated by similar bodies appeared to 
experience small drops in coverage both during and after the transition. However, these results 
are dependent on the regression specification and some specifications for no significant results.  
When regulatory board appointments lasted 5 or more years, the number of employees 
decreased by roughly 25-30 percent during the transition. After the transition, the results were 
less robust, but employment appeared to fall by an additional 14 percent.  Additionally, 
connections per employee increased between 27 and 31 percent during the transition. Results 
after the transition were less clear-cut, but connections per employee again seem to have 
increased. Changes in output per employee were not very robust, but there was some evidence of 
a decrease during the transition followed by an increase after the transition. These results became 
insignificant when additional controls were added to the regression specifications.  
When regulatory board appointments were of a longer duration, the results suggest that 
there were increases in losses between 12 and 16 percent during the transition. In the post-
transition period, relatively large reductions in losses—roughly 40 percent—were observed, 
more than offsetting the increases seen during the transition period.  
When considering the impact of longer duration of regulatory body appointments on 
dollar prices during the transition, mixed results were found. Dollar prices rose during the post-
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transition period while prices in real local currency fell between 9 and 16 percent during both the 
transition and post-transition periods. 
There was some evidence that quality increased when appointments to the regulatory 
body were of a longer duration, although not all results were significant. Changes after the 
transition were not significant. 
 
4.4.4 Investor  Nationality 
When only foreign investors were considered, the analysis yielded mixed results during 
the transition and non-significant results after the transition. When there was a mix of foreign 
and local investors, the number of connections fell by 1.0 and 2.2 percent during the transition. 
After the transition, the basic regression specification showed an increase of 1.4 percent in the 
number of connections. However, after other controls were added to the regression, the results 
were no longer significant, suggesting that covariance exists with some of the other variables. 
Additionally, output decreased between 4.4 and 10.9 percent during the transition and between 
2.1 and 4.0 percent after the transition. When both foreign and local investors were involved, 
slight increases in output were observed before controlling for other regulatory characteristics. 
However, after adding other controls to the regression specification, the changes became 
insignificant. 
Coverage decreased by roughly 3 to 4 percent during the transition (relative to coverage 
levels with only local investors), when only foreign investors were present, while no significant 
changes were observed after the transition. Similar results were found were there was a mix of 
foreign and local investors.  
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Employee reductions were about 12 to 31 percent higher during the transition for 
companies with foreign investors vis-à-vis companies with no foreign investors. After the 
transition, no additional changes were observed. Companies with both foreign and local investors 
had smaller changes during the transition than those with only foreign investors but, after the 
transition, they experienced additional employee reductions. Furthermore, when contracts were 
awarded to firms with only foreign investors, the changes in labor productivity were either not 
clear-cut or insignificant. When both local and foreign investors were involved, labor 
productivity appeared to decrease during the transition, followed by an increase after the 
transition. Changes in both directions were generally between 6 and 10 percent.  
For firms with only foreign ownership, no significant changes were observed during the 
transition. In the post-transition period, distributional losses fell by roughly 12 to 26 percent. A 
similar pattern emerged for firms with both foreign and domestic ownership: no significant 
changes during the transition and a reduction in losses between 15 and 19 percent after the 
transition.  
When there were only foreign investors, mixed results were found in dollars during the 
transition, while prices increased by between 14 and 26 percent after the transition. In the case of 
only foreign investors and real local currency, prices fell during the transition and increased after 
the transition. When both foreign and local investors were involved, prices in dollars fell 
substantially (by roughly 23 percent) during the transition, only to recover after that. In contrast, 
prices in real local currency did not experience significant changes during the transition; 
however after the transition, there is some evidence that prices fell, but several of the regression 
specifications produced insignificant results.  
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Results for firms with foreign investors were not very robust, but some specifications 
exhibit decreases in quality both during and after the transition. For firms with both foreign and 
local ownership, quality increased by about 29 percent during the transition. Some specifications 
also found increases after the transition. 
 
4.4.5 Award Criteria 
The impact of two types of award criteria was analyzed: highest price and best 
investment plan. Concessions awarded based on the highest price criterion experienced drops 
between 1.3 and 2.6 percent during the transition. There were no significant changes after the 
transition. On the contrary, concessions that were awarded to the bidder with the best investment 
plan experienced a small increase (roughly 2.5 percent) in the number of connections during the 
transition. Similar to the concessions awarded based on the highest price criterion, there were no 
significant results found after the transition for concession with the best investment plan. When 
privatizations/concessions were awarded based on a highest price criterion, no significant results 
were found. (Repetitive) When the award criterion was based on the best investment plan, no 
significant results were found during the transition, yet an increase in output of about 2 percent 
was noticed after the transition. It is worth noting that these results are those reflected after 
controlling for time trends. 
When privatizations/concessions were awarded based on a highest price criterion, 
coverage appeared to decrease slightly during the transition, but then increase faintly after the 
transition. When the award criterion was the best investment plan, the opposite occurred: 
coverage increase slightly during the transition but then decreased mildly after the transition. It is 
important to note that these are the obtained results are after controlling for time trends. 
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Privatizations/concessions awarded according to the highest price reported some 
reduction during the transition, but after controlling for other factors, these changes were not 
significant. Employment reductions were also encountered during the post-transition period. 
Privatizations/ concessions awarded according to the best investment plan had some relative 
increases in employee numbers both during and after the transition, but after controlling for other 
factors, these changes were less significant. Moreover, when contracts were awarded according 
to the best investment plan, no significant changes in labor productivity were observed. When 
contracts were awarded based on the highest price offer, output per employee appears to have 
fallen by roughly 20 percent during the transition, followed by an increase of about the same 
amount after the transition. Connections per employee for highest price cases seem to have 
increased by about 50 percent after the transition.  
Whether or not a contract was awarded according to the highest bid did not significantly 
affect performance during the transition. After the transition, distributional losses seem to have 
increased slightly in highest bid cases. In cases where the winner was determined by the best 
investment plan, there were no significant results. 
When contracts were awarded according to the highest price criteria, prices in dollars 
appeared to drop during the transition but then increase after the transition. However, different 
regression specifications produced somewhat mixed results. In real local currency, various 
results were found during the transition, followed by a drop after the transition. When contracts 
were awarded based on the best investment plan, no significant results were found in dollars 
during the transition, whereas an increase of 14 percent was observed after the transition. When 
the case of the best investment plan criteria is considered in real local currency, prices appear to 
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have fallen during the transition. However, no clear results in local currency were found after the 
transition. 
For the case in which contracts were awarded based on a highest price criterion, various 
results (some positive, some negative) on quality were found during the transition. After the 
transition, some results pointed to a decrease in quality, with others were not significant. No 
significant results in quality were exposed after the transition. When contracts were awarded 
based on a best investment plan criterion, quality seems to have decreased by about 18 percent 
during the transition, while no significant changes were found for the post-transition period. 
 
4.4.6   Tariff Regulation 
In order to identify the effect of the type of tariff regulation on network expansion, both 
“rate of return” and “price cap” regulation were analyzed. Concessions regulated according to 
rate of return experienced an increase in the number of connections between 2.4 and 6.3 percent 
during the transition. After the transition, the number of connections increased an additional 2 
percent. Concessions subject to price cap tariff regulation do not appear to have experienced 
significant changes, although a parallel analysis of changes in growth rates indicated a decrease 
in the number of connections during the transition.  When analyzing output, no significant 
changes were found when tariffs where regulated according to rate of return. Price cap regulation 
yielded an increase in output of about 5 percent during the transition yet no significant changes 
after the transition.  
While, small increases in coverage were seen under rate-of-return tariff regulation during 
the transition, no significant changes were observed for price cap tariff regulation schemes.  
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Utilities subject to rate of return regulation showed large relative employee reductions—
roughly 60 percent—during the transition in some (but not all) of the econometric specifications. 
Relative employment increases were identified in some specifications after the transition, but one 
of the specifications showed a slight decrease. Firms regulated under price cap systems 
experienced some employee reductions during the transition; however these changes were not 
significant after controlling for other factors.  When tariffs for privatizations/concessions were 
regulated according to a rate-of-return system, there is some evidence that labor productivity 
increased during the transition. Nevertheless, no significant results were encountered in labor 
productivity after the transition. While, under price cap regulation, labor productivity appears to 
have increased during the transition, no significant changes were observed after the transition.  
When tariffs were regulated according to rate of return, there were no significant changes 
during the transition, and distributional losses fell somewhat following the transition. However, 
under price cap tariff regulation, distributional losses seem to have increased after the transition.  
When tariffs were regulated according to a price cap methodology, no significant results 
were found in dollars. However, in real local currency, prices increased during both periods. 
When rate-of-return tariff regulation was implemented, prices in dollars first increased during the 
transition but then decreased after the transition. Prices in real local currency showed mixed 
results.  
 
When tariffs were regulated according to a rate of return method, mixed results were 
found during the transition. After the transition, one regression specification showed quality 
reductions, but these became insignificant once more controls were added to the regression. 
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4.5  Conclusions and policy recommendations 
 
We have provided a brief overview of infrastructure reforms in Latin America during the 
1990s, and analyzed the determinants of performance, with a focus of the regulatory factor.  A 
number of main messages emerge. First, private participation generated important 
improvements, but they were mostly concentrated in the transition period (around the 
privatization event). Second, only a share of those benefits was transferred to consumers. And 
third, significant performance heterogeneity within and among sectors may be explained by 
intrinsic characteristics of the reform process, such as the privatization mechanism, the level of 
regulatory development, and the concession design.  
In particular the analysis shows that:   
(i)  Generally autonomous regulatory bodies seem to be correlated with greater 
reductions in the number of employees, while older-through experience and 
capacity- institutions result in lower price increases.  
(ii)  When pricing is regulated according to the rate of return, companies have higher 
network expansion than in the case of price-cap regulation. Consistently, those 
firms under price-cap regulation experience higher reductions of their labor force, 
but lower increases in labor productivity. Additionally, the latter firms present less 
improvement in both distributional losses and quality, while also exhibiting higher 
price increases when compared to those under the rate-of-return regulation. 
These results suggest one main policy implication: change in ownership has significant 
effects in improving efficiency and quality. However, regulatory structure, framework and 
quality are important determinant of sector performance.  
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Additionally, there is a need to complete the reforms, particularly the so-called “second 
generation regulatory reforms.” Without these reforms – that include the completion and 
improvement of the regulatory framework, setting up safeguards and procedures to dissuade 
excessive-frivoulos-contract renegotiations, and increasing competition when feasible – post-
privatization improvements are limited and probably unsustainable. Likewise without a 
transparent and predictable regulatory framework, needed private financing will be difficult to 
secure. Obviously, the importance of competition, regulation, and contract design is closely 
related to technological characteristics within an industry. For example, technological 
developments in the telecommunications sector, facilitates the emergence and feasibility of 
effective competition and substitution, providing alternatives to the service, by means other than 
fixed telephony. But that requires using regulation and antitrust, according to jurisdiction, as a 
tool to control for abuse of dominance by incumbents.  In water and sanitation, remaining natural 
monopolies make the move towards increased competition a more difficult task. This implies 
relying more on well-designed concession contracts with regulation as a tool to guarantee the 
appropriate compliance and efficient (albeit second best) performance.  In either case, regulation 
is a key instrument, especially if one needs to reduce regulatory risks, attract private investments 
to support the Latin American needs in infrastructure and capture a larger share of the efficiency 
gains generated by the private participation. 
 
5. Final  Remarks 
 
We have tested the impact of regulation of private infrastructure operators on sector 
performance, from three separate angles. We have found that:  
  46 
 
 
•  Quality of regulation is a significant determinant of the divergence between the 
overall profitability of the concession and its corresponding hurdle rate, explaining around 20 
percent of the variation. However, regulatory efforts seem to be more closely associated with 
keeping tariffs as low as possible for current consumers, than keeping profitability well aligned 
with hurdle rates of return. 
•  Price caps lead a significant increase of the probability of renegotiation. This 
phenomenon brings the convergence of rate of return regulation and price cap regulation even 
closer, because the outcomes of the renegotiation process often include increasing the number of 
cost components with an automatic pass-through to tariffs, toward a hybrid system.  
•  Existence of a regulator at the signing of contract reduces renegotiations. 
Comparing three specific contracts out of the initial sample, and using the probabilities predicted 
by the empirical model, we show that had a regulator been in place at the time of awarding the 
contract, the respective probabilities of renegotiation in the last year of existence of the contract 
would have been reduced from 29.7, 9.9, and 3.1 percent, to 5.3, 0.3, and 0.2 percent 
respectively.  Also autonomy/independence of regulator matters. When the regulator does not 
belong to a ministry, there is a significantly lower probability of government-led renegotiation. 
In that regard, these firm-level results confirm some cross-country studies results that show the 
importance of experienced and independent regulators in the telecommunication and electricity 
sectors  
•  The regulators filter and dissuade opportunistic private operator led renegotiation 
and in the case of government-led renegotiation, the regulator acts as barrier against political 
opportunism. Regulation attempts to protect investors and ultimately consumers from the 
opportunistic behavior of the government. Ideally, the regulator’s objective should be to maintain 
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alignment between a company’s rate of return and its cost of capital. However, the closeness of 
such an alignment depends on the structure and institutionality of the regulatory framework and 
of course on quality of the regulator. 
•  Impact of the regulator is stronger in weak governance environments. In those 
contexts, the regulator-protected by its autonomous characteristics- can play a key role in 
informing civil society and with actions aimed at dissuading opportunistic behavior, by 
governments or operators, championing transparency and rallying stakeholders for compliance 
with regulatory framework and to raise the costs of opportunistic behavior.  Also, as regulators 
often have a role in the design of contracts, they can supply part of the missing governance, 
assisting in the design of better contracts from the start, which reduces the necessity of posterior 
adjustments for unforeseen contingencies or opportunistic behavior.  
•  Differences in the outcomes of infrastructure services provided by private sector 
participation are explained to some extent by differences in the institutionality, characteristics 
and quality of the regulatory framework, such as autonomy, type of price regulation, and 
structure of the regulatory board and so on.  
 
In summary, we have shown that as the theory indicates, regulation matters. The 
empirical work here reported has shown that on three relevant economic aspects: aligning costs 
and tariffs, dissuading renegotiations and improving productivity, quality of service, coverage 
and tariffs—the structure, institutions and procedures of regulation matters.  Thus significant 
efforts should continue to be made to improve the structure, quality and institutionality of 
regulation. Regulation matters in protecting both consumers and investors and in aligning closely 
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financial returns and the costs of capital and in capturing higher levels of benefits from the 
provision of infrastructure services by the private sector.   
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Notes 
 
1 In Brazil, for example, dissatisfaction with privatization has increased from 40 to 60 percent of 
the population during 1998-2004 while in smaller countries, such as Guatemala and Panama, this 
index reaches more than 80 percent of the population. Even in Chile, commonly seen as the 
champion of structural reforms, dissatisfaction is predominant (see Latinobarómetro surveys for 
1998 and 2004). Indeed, public authorities and multilateral institutions, such as the IMF and the 
World Bank, once sponsors of privatization, are now discussing ways of increasing public 
investments in infrastructure without jeopardizing sound fiscal management. The policy-making 
pendulum is, then, back to public investments as either if infrastructure reforms and privatization 
had never been implemented or, even worse, if reforms were fully completed, all lessons had 
been taken, and adjustments had been made. 
2 Guasch (2004) shows that the incidence of renegotiation is about 42 percent of all concessions 
and about 55 and 75 percent for concessions in the transport and water sectors.  And the 
incidence is even much higher for concessions regulated under a price-cap regime. Even more 
striking is how fast those renegotiations take place. The time interval between the granting of the 
concessions and renegotiation is about 2.1 years, and for water concessions is even quicker, 
about 1.6 years.   
3 Simple differential 1 excludes terminal value, Simple differential 2 includes terminal value, 
Simple differential 3 includes terminal value and adjustment for management fee, Simple 
Differential 4 includes terminal value and adjustments for management fee and transfer pricing.  
4 One weakness of regulatory commissions, perhaps captured here in these estimates, is the 
higher political intervention, since often each relevant political party gets to designate its own 
commissioner.    
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5 Bid, Direct adjudication, invitation, petition or request. 
6 Highest cannon, highest price, tariff, lowest government subsidy, investment plan, shorter 
duration of the concession or multiple criteria. 
7 Operation, BOT, BOO, privatization, etc. 
8 Law, decree, contract or license. 
9 Revenue cap, price cap, rate of return or no regulation. 
10 The government, the concessionaire, both or nobody. 
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